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Abstract—One of the most prevalent, ancient and devastating 
vulnerabilities which is increasing rapidly is Memory   
corruption. It is a vulnerability where a memory location 
contents of a computer system are altered because of 
programming errors allowing execution of arbitrary codes. 
It particularly happens in low-level programming 
languages such as C, C++ because of their lack of memory 
safety. Many defense techniques against this kind of 
attacks have been presented and implemented to prevent 
it. However, an advanced version of the attack can bypass 
some of these techniques and harm the system. In this 
work, we present an overview of the Memory corruption 
attacks and the existing mitigation techniques for both 
compilers and operating systems. We hope that this survey 
will provide sufficient details that can be useful for 
researchers and system designer. 
Index terms: Memory Corruption,Vulnerabilities,attacks, 
technique to prevent hacking.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
In the past two decades, Memory Corruption attacks 
have captured the attention of security research community 
[1]. The first recognized worm that exploited a memory 
corruption attack to spread itself was called the Morris Worm. 
This kind of attack is well-known for its high exploitability 
that allows the attackers to simply execute arbitrary codes. It 
takes control of the remote code execution according to latest 
Microsoft report [2]. 
There are three main types of memory errors that can 
cause the Memory corruption: accessing uninitiated, accessing 
out-of-bounds as well as accessing freed memories. Also, 
different software bugs can cause these errors. For example, 
out of bound memory might be occurred due to incorrect 
bound check, incorrect allocation or lack of bound check or 
others [3]. A well-known example of memory corruption 
attacks is buffer overflow exploitation.  
This attack happens when a program tries to read or 
write exceeding the end of a buffer (also known as a bounded 
array). Some popular string manipulation functions, which are 
normally used along with an array variable as their 
parameters, are strcpy(), memcpy() and strcmp (). These 
functions are generally vulnerable when a form bound 
checking is missing [4]. The security research community has 
implemented different techniques to prevent such attacks but 
advanced attack with a combination of complex strategies can 
still bypass them. In this paper, a survey of the memory 
corruption vulnerabilities is being presented as well as some of 
the existing mitigation techniques against them.  
 
The rest of the survey is organized as the follows: 
Section II describes the buffer overrun attacks and Section III 
present the existing countermeasures. Section VI presents the 
summary and conclusions are concluded in Section V. 
II. BUFFER OVERFLOW   
A. General information about buffer overflow attacks 
            This section introduces the concept of buffer overflow 
and how malicious users or hackers can attack the Memory 
Corruption, it can be exploited by buffer overflow. A buffer 
overflow happens when the size of the data that entered to the 
buffer is larger than the size of the data that the buffer can 
handle. In another word, buffer overflow is simply occurs 
when data size reaches the out-of-bounds of the memory [5] 
Based on that, many attackers can exploit this vulnerability to 
force a system crash, and control-flow hijacking as well as 
some malicious users can run an arbitrary code. Plenty of the 
applications that built by some programming languages are 
mostly leading to buffer overflow as the buffer that has been 
specified is not large enough or the developers of these 
applications do not pay attention of checking overflow issues.  
These common mistakes particularly occur with C/C++ 
as these two languages have lack to build prediction 
against buffer overrun. According to the aforementioned, 
applications that build in C/C++ programming languages are 
more vulnerable to attack [6]. 
Generally, there are two most common techniques that 
can be utilized by an attacker to attack through buffer 
overflow attacks. The two techniques are stack and heap 
attacks.  
To make the buffer overflow more understandable, an 
example has been used for this purpose (Figure 1).   
Figure 1: An example to clarify buffer overflow. 
 
In the example the buffer is overflow with 2 bytes 
because the buffer is allocated for 8 bytes in the code and the 
data that has been entered is 10 bytes. Underlying cause that is 
the strcpy() does not inspect bounds so attackers can write 
anything outside the buffer space. Furthermore, these two 
bytes can be utilized to run shell code by attackers.  
B. Stack–relied   buffer overrun attacks. 
In this part of study, we produce that how attackers can 
exploit stack-based buffer overflow. As we mentioned 
previously that a buffer overflow occurs when the input data 
size is which should be handled by buffer is larger than the size 
of buffer itself. On another word can be descried as it happens 
when insufficient boundary checking [7]. Consequently, an 
attacker can exploit this drawback point to write malicious data 
in the memory out of buffer,  
An example has been utilized to clear stack-rely buffer 
overflow attacks. Suppose we have this code. 
Figure 2: An example to clarify buffer overflow with stack-
based overrun attack.   
Indeed, the code in Figure 2 demonstrates that the size of 
buffer is constant so very simple that the string in argv[1] 
might be exceeded the size of the buffer size which results  
stack-based  buffer overrun attacks. Consequently, the code 
allows attackers to write malicious data to memory outside of 
buffer. 
C. Heap-relied Buffer overrun Attack.  
 Heap overflow is a kind of buffer overrun. It occurs 
once a chunk of memory is assigned to heap also data is 
typing to this memory with no limitation of checking the size 
of the data that have been written. Hence, this vulnerable 
allows attackers to overwrite some important data structure in 
the heap for instance the heap header.  
Furthermore, there are two kinds of heap with windows 
can be explained as follow. The first type is default heap 
which is utilized with windows32 to manage and specify 
memory for both local and global variable as well as local 
memory by using functions [malloc()].  Second type is 
dynamic heap is made by some methods like HeapCreate() 
which returns the address to a memory chunk that includes the 
heap header [8]. 
 In the example (Figure 3) the attacker has modified the 
return address therefore call procedure with the new address 
return address as a result the attacker can control by executing 
the malicious code which has been allocated somewhere in the 
process.    
   Figure 3: An example to illustrate buffer overrun with 
heap-based overrun attack [27]. 
 
D. Block started by symbol-relid buffer overflow attacks  
The whole idea of Block started by symbol (BSS) is 
any program starts running, all variables either local or global 
which are not assigning value as initial or these variables    
initialized with zero for these variables, BSS will generate 
automatically. Consequently, the BSS area results buffer 
overrun in the buffer which has been created as BSS area. 
Subsequently, the BSS area can be exploited by some hackers 
to overwriting some data [9].  
E. Other hacking techniques relevant Buffer Overrun. 
 
1) Format String Exploit: The vulnerabilities of these kind 
of techniques are resulted by incorrect invocations of some of 
function like printf, sprintf and syslog. An attacker can exploit 
that by entering incorrect data for the first parameter of the 
printf () function, as we expect the first parameter has to be 
printf(‘’%s’’,buffer) to clearly that an example has been used 
for this purpose (Figure 4).  
We assume that the attacker inputs in the first argument 
of the printf() function ‘’ "\x10\x01\x48\x08 %x %x %x %x 
%s"’’. This vulnerability provides to the attacker the 
possibility of overwriting essential program flags which leads 
that can control access privileges. On another hand, the 
attacker can write arbitrary data into memory. Moreover, 
overwriting the return address on the stack by using function 
pointer [10].   
 
      Figure 4: An example to clearly Format String Attack [11].   
 
2) Vulnerability in Numerical Handlin: The problem of 
numeric treatment that when we do incorrect math operation 
or numeric conversion. Numeric handling includes integer 
Overflow or Wraparound and particularly they are utilized with 
buffer Overflow attacks [12]. Integer Overflow happens once 
doing an operation such as multiplying for two numbers and 
the result of the operation is too large which it exceeds the 
range of algorithm expression which determines for data type 
that cause buffer overflow. That leads to exploit by attackers 
as did mention in the section that has illustrated buffer 
overflow attacks [13].  
III. THE CURRENT TECHNIQUES AGAINST MEMORY 
CORRUPTION ATTACKS. 
This section sheds some light on the different 
countermeasures that have been used in operating system 
through complier and linkers.  
 
A. OS countermeasures. 
 
We consider five main techniques that have been used 
in the operating systems (OS) in order to prevent an attacker.  
 
1) Data Execution Prevention (DEP): This technique is 
used to force the memory to be writable with no possibility to 
be executable or it is executable but must be read-only such as 
code segments. The protection technique has developed in 
order to hinder or at least reduce the normal exploits such as 
the vulnerabilities that attacked by existing code or writing 
malicious code inside data segments [13]. The fundamental 
purpose of this mechanism is preventing the program code of 
any possibility to execute in stack area and heap area 
furthermore shared libraries. DEP with windows can be 
divided for two types as following: Software-enforce as 
explained previously it assists to prevent code of executing in 
stack or heap area.  
Software DEP can describe as blocking for hackers who 
use exception-handing in windows to write malicious code. 
Hardware-enforce DEP can be defined as making mark for 
memory that have to be non-executable.  This enforcement 
helps to make all memory locations in a process are not 
executable excluding of that the code which includes 
executable code. The DEP is starting with windows XP SP2 
and especially with windows 32 bits version as feature 
security which uses in both Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) 
and Intel. The processor that support this feature has No-
Execute (NX) as known ADM / Execute Disable Bit (XD) as 
known Intel. The primary key that should be mentioned is that 
any processor which supports these features, the processor has 
to be executing when Physical Address Extension (PAE) 
feature is enable [14]. However, the attackers can use more 
intricate techniques to corrupt memory for example, using 
return-to-libc and return-oriented-programming [15]. 
 
 
2) ASCII: ASCII-armor is a prophylactic security 
technology which designed by evolving Exec-Shield function 
through Red Hat, Inc. ASCII-armor is based on the Exec-
Shield where ASCII-armor becomes enable when we assign  
the  Exec-Shield option in addition re-link the kernel. While 
when we assign the non-Exec-Shield in this case ASCII-armor 
becomes disable. In very briefly, this technique utilizes with 
sharing library as we know sharing library provides ability to 
extend some external codes which executed in run time, some 
attackers exploit this vulnerability to inject vector into 
memory. At the end, the ASCII-armor feature uses to block 
attackers copying malicious code into memory [16].   
 
   
3) Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR): The 
first starting of using ASLR was in 2001 with Linux as known 
Linux patch while in 2007 was the first using this protecting 
technology with windows operation systems and especially 
with Vista. Utilizing ASLR with windows operating systems 
provide 256 address space locations. More specifically, adding 
ASLR feature to Vista raises the number of probability for 
address space locations. Consequence of this, the possibility of 
pinpointing the correct location to run code with Vista after 
adding ASLR became very complicated so attackers have 
solely one chance out of 256. However, 2011 was the first 
beginning of using ASLR with Mac OSX and both iOS as well 
as google android [17]. This mechanism becomes very 
powerful prediction against memory misuse when it integrates 
with Data Execution Prevention (DEP) technology. 
This technology randomizes system’s virtual memory 
layout when each new code runs, or the system is booted. 
That’s leading to, an attacker cannot find out the virtual address 
of related memory locations that required to make a control-
flow or other hacking techniques. The main aim of ASLR is to 
prevent attackers of executing shellcode in stack area or heap 
area additionally shared libraries by randomizing them. That’s 
mean, it randomizes the locations of stack area and heap area 
moreover share libraries.  
At the end of this section, we can take two advantages 
of using this effective protection technology.  
Firstly, it can defense against remote attacks. Secondly, local 
attacker would not be able to attack memory because of 
randomly offsetting memory structures and module base 
addresses. Although, ASLR does not prevent buffer overflow at 
all it just makes the ability of exploiting memory is very 
difficult [23]. Even that, ASLR has two drawbacks: Lack of 
entropy. Leak information.  
 
4) Kernel Address space layout Randomization 
(kASLR): This mechanism attempts to randomize both 
program and data locations in kernel area when the kernel start 
up (Figure 5). The main advantage of this technology is 
moving the interrupt descriptor table (IDT) in a way form 
most of the kernel to a location in read-only memory. As well-
known SIDT instruction assists to find out the location of IDT 
which previously utilized to detect the location of kernel code, 
so the technique does give any possibility for adversary to use 
it because IDT has located in elsewhere.  
 
Furthermore, kASLR is used to safeguard overwriting 
because it is read-only. Finally, the Kernel ASLR has been 
used with Linux kernel 3.14 version therefore has been 
developed to include randomization of the module load 
location In Linux kernel 3.15 [18].  
 
 Figure 5: clarification of kernel ASLR [28]. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 gives a comparative summary of bits of entropy in 
Linux vs PaX vs ASLR_NG.  
 
 
B. Compiler and Linker Countermeasures. 
 
1) GCC Compiler Options: In this part of work, we 
introduce the technologies that have been added in GCC and 
supported by compiler options.   
 
a) IO2BO detection.  
Integer Overflow-to-buffer-overrun (IO2BO) is one of the 
most common vulnerabilities that used by attackers. As 
illustrated previously in (Vulnerability in Numerical 
Handling) section of the paper that Integer Overflow occurs 
when the output of any calculation such as (multiplication or 
dividing by zero) is surpass the range of the data type [19].   
 
The fundamental reason that made Integer Overflow is 
extremely popular because lots of programmer have not yet 
pay to the magnitude of the danger that comes from integer 
overflow. 
Figure 6: comparative summary of bits of entropy [29].  
 
 Based on the threads of integer overflow compiling has 
supported by –ftrapv Option which uses to detect integer 
overflow with addition, subtraction, multiplication, and 
division for signed integers when a program is running.  
Obviously, when a program identify integer overflow must be 
stop. The first appearing was in GCC version 3.4.   
However, it is not possible way to detect dividing by zero, so 
it is not completely detection for integer overflow [20]. 
 
b) Address Sanitizer. 
This tool is very fast way to detect an error in memory. 
Basically, it was evolved by Google. In short, this option has 
been implemented in GCC to detect six type of ways that used 
by attackers to hack the memory.  
The six types can be listed as following: Out-of-bounds, Use-
after-free, Use-after-return, Use-after-scope, Double-free, 
invalid free and Memory leaks. Defiantly, when these kind of 
hacking techniques detected, the program will stop 
immediately to prevent attackers of exploiting these 
vulnerabilities by corrupting the memory [21].  
 
c) Stack Smashing Protector (SSP). 
 
This option was released in GCC as a patch   before 
4.1 and has been applied in 4.1 version. Most importantly, this 
security feature has been developed to defense against 
memory attacks such as return address, frame pointers as well 
as pointers in stack area. This mechanism was added to the 
compiler to protect program against stack mashing attacks. 
The main idea of SSP is to detect that the return address has 
been modified before the function returns by inserting 
‘’canary’’ word underneath return address on the stack as 
shown in (Figure 7). Therefore, checking whether the canary 
is intact or not before moving to return address [22].  
In fact, canary can be used merely when the buffer size is 8 
bytes or larger while a canary would be able to enter in buffer 
when the size is 4 bytes or over with Ubuntu 10.10. 
Additionally, to prevent hackers of finding the canary value or 
its location by buffer overflow. For this purpose, 32-bits 
random number has been used as value for the canary to make 
the possibility of guessing canary value by attackers is very 
complicated.  These 32-bits random numbers will be selected 
when the program starts up.  
 Figure 7: using Canary to protect against Stack   
smashing attacks [30 [1] [1] [1]].  
 
d) Automatic Fortification. 
 
Automatic Fortification is a function has been 
implemented in GCC especially in 4.0 version. Most 
importantly, the Automatic Fortification has been added to 
prevent Format String attacks.  
As well-known, Format String attacks is one of ways that 
results buffer overflow (illustrated in Format String Exploit of 
this paper) and that assists attackers to write or insert 
malicious code. Depending on that, any function has a buffer 
must be substituted with safe functions. Automatic 
Fortification due inspecting string size, if it is larger than 
buffer size that has been determined for storing the string at 
runtime. That’s mean, checking whether the buffer size is 
sufficient or not before calling the function that results buffer 
overrun.  
Finally, this feature is not effective way to prevent 
Format String attacks at all, but it is only reducing it. Because 
this feature is not being able to detect the Format String 
attacks when a function passes a buffer for another function as 
a parameter.   
 
  
2) Stack-Shield protection.: This technology is one of the 
runtime techniques which has been implemented to guard 
return address. Basically, the key idea is copy the return 
address and keep it in somewhere that should not be 
overflowed memory space at runtime. Thus, the return address 
that has been saved somewhere will be used instead of 
utilizing the return address on the stack that could be exploited 
by an attacker. In this case, this tool can reduce risk magnitude 
that comes from the exploiting return address [24].  
 
IV. OTHER TECHNOLOGIES AGAINST MEMORY CORRUPTION 
ATTACKS.    
 
Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) is one of the 
techniques that has been implemented to defense against code 
injection attacks by randomly modifying the instructions. 
More specifically, this feature is used to prevent Return-
Oriented Programming attacks.  
 Ultimately, ISR is not enough way to avoid control flow 
hijacking attacks because some of techniques are not 
necessary require to know the Instruction Set such as return-
to-libc attack. Moreover, using LibsafePlu for Runtime Buffer 
Overflow Protection [25] 
 
Pin, this tool has been implemented for security reason 
at runtime which used to defense against return address. It 
works as following, when the program starts running, it is 
potentially analysis and create Binary Translation for the code 
that has been inserted by user.   
Eventually, Pin is supported by these operating systems Linux, 
Windows, and OS X [26]. 
V. SUMMARY 
 
We derive some generic techniques that have been 
implemented to defend against memory corruption attacks. 
These technologies are implemented either with operating 
systems by default or with Compiler and Linker as can be 
illustrated as following. 1) Operating system: One most 
common options that have been provided by operating system 
to defense against memory corruption attacks is kernel ASLR. 
Basically, ASLR is supported by new operating systems such 
as Linux, windows and OS. Even if ASLR is made great 
protection but is not efficiency technique because it has lack 
of entropy moreover leak of information. 
2) Compiler and Linker:  There are many techniques such as 
(Address Sanitizer, SSP, IBO and etc.) have been implemented 
with Compiler and Linker by default to defense against buffer 
overflow but they are enough to prevent attackers for attacking 
memory. Thus, the programmer must be pay attention to 
secure his/her program because there are lots vulnerabilities 
that can be exploited by attackers.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we highlight most common technologies 
that can be exploited by attackers to hack memory. 
Additionally, we present existing countermeasures that have 
been used to prevent or minimize memory corruption attacks. 
Our aim in this paper is to assist researchers and system 
designers who wants to improve the current countermeasures 
for memory corruption attacks either by making combination 
for available countermeasures   or by adding new feature(s).  
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